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Abstract 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of working memory in verbal 
deception in children. We presented six-to seven-year-olds with a temptation resistance 
paradigm—they played a trivia game and were then given an opportunity to peek at the final 
answers on the back of a card. Measures of both verbal and visuo-spatial working memory 
were included. The good liars performed better in the verbal working memory test in both 
processing and recall, compared to the bad liars. However, there was no difference in visuo-
spatial working scores between good and bad liars. This pattern suggests that verbal working 
memory plays a role in processing and manipulating the multiple pieces of information 
involved in lie-telling.  
 
Keywords: deception, lying, verbal working memory, visuo-spatial working memory, 
semantic leakage. 
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Introduction  
Verbal deception, or lying behavior, is an important ability in a range of different 
contexts, from social interaction and politeness situations (Talwar, Murphy, & Lee, 2007), to 
court witness and legal proceedings (Lee, Cameron, Doucette, & Talwar, 2002). A commonly 
used paradigm to investigate verbal deception is the temptation resistance paradigm (Lewis et 
al., 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999). The researcher instructs the child not to look at a specific, 
and often desirable, object, such as a toy, placed behind the child’s chair. The researcher then 
leaves the room for a brief period. The researcher returns to the room, and asks the child if 
they peeked at the toy. They then ask the child a series of follow-up questions, involving the 
identity and color of the toy that was placed behind them.  
If the child peeks at the toy, their ability to feign ignorance when answering the 
follow-up questions is called semantic leakage control and it involves second-order belief 
understanding (Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007). In order to skillfully avoid detection, the child 
has to first adopt the examiner’s perspective. The child assumes that the examiner is unaware 
that they have looked at the toy when the examiner left the room. Consequently, the child 
surmises that the researcher expects them to have no knowledge of the correct answer to the 
follow-up questions about the toy’s size and color. The child’s ability to hide their 
transgressions by lying about the size and color of the toy demonstrates how well they are 
able to understand the researcher’s perspective and create a statement to match that 
perspective. 
It is well-established that verbal deception is evident in children as young as three 
years old (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Fu, Evans, & Lee, 2012; Lewis, Stanger, & 
Sullivan, 1989; also Lee & Evans, in press, for a review). Lying abilities improve with age 
(Talwar & Lee, 2002), with several researchers pointing to the development of false belief—
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understanding another’s perspective, as one explanation for this improvement (Chandler et 
al., 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar, Gordon, Lee, 2007; Talwar & Lee, 2008).  
Other executive function skills, such as working memory, may also play a role in 
verbal deception (Evans & Lee, 2011). Working memory is the ability to process multiple 
pieces of information, continually update memory contents with incoming stimuli, and recall 
the appropriate information (Baddeley, 1996; Cowan, 2006; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & 
Conway, 1999; Lustig, May, & Hasher, 2001; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & 
Hegarty, 2001). There is reason to predict that working memory is involved in lie-telling as it 
could be recruited to keep multiple pieces of information in mind, such as the researcher’s 
perspective and the actual transgression that occurred. The child would also rely on working 
memory to update their responses with follow-up questions from the researcher, and shift 
between the researcher’s perspective and the fabricated reality that they constructed in order 
to avoid detection.  
 To date, there have been a few studies that have examined the role of working 
memory in verbal deception. However, the results have been mixed. In a 2008 study, Talwar 
and Lee gave three- to eight-year-olds a memory game, where there were six boxes with 
stickers. The children had to select one box at a time to find the sticker and remove it. The 
boxes were scrambled after each turn. This game involved visuo-spatial memory as the child 
had to keep track of the boxes they had already selected in order to retrieve the remaining 
stickers. When Talwar and Lee looked at the children’s responses in a temptation resistance 
paradigm task, they did not find any difference between the lie-tellers, confessors, and non-
peekers. In contrast, Evans and Lee (2011) found that older children (8-16 years) with higher 
working memory scores, measured with backward digit recall, were better at semantic 
leakage control, or covering their tracks. One possible reason for the difference in findings 
could be due to the nature of the working memory tasks. When it comes to verbal deception, 
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verbal working memory may play a more prominent role compared to visuo-spatial working 
memory. Thus, it is possible that Talwar & Lee (2008) did not find a significant difference in 
their groups because they used a visuo-spatial memory task. Age may also have played a role 
as Evans and Lee recruited an older sample than those who participated in Talwar and Lee’s 
study. Research by Lewis and colleagues have found that there is a clear age advantage when 
it comes to verbal deception, possibly as a function of better language skills (Lewis et al., 
1989; see also Evans & Lee, 2011). 
The aim of the present study was to clarify the roles of verbal and visuo-spatial 
working memory in verbal deception using a temptation resistance paradigm. Children played 
a trivia game and were then given an opportunity to peek at the final answer, although they 
were told not to peek. This paradigm allowed us to examine the children’s ability to control 
semantic leakage—their ability to maintain consistency in their responses while telling lies. 
 In order to extend the previous research that investigated the role of working 
memory, we included both verbal and visuo-spatial measures of working memory and 
calculated the processing and recall aspects of the tests. Most theoretical frameworks of 
working memory include both verbal and visuo-spatial components that are related, but have 
dissociable effects on other tasks (Alloway & Alloway, 2013; Alloway, Gathercole, & 
Pickering, 2006; Baddeley, 1996; Engle, Kane, & Tulhoski, 1999; Miyake et al., 2001). For 
example, verbal working memory is linked to language skills (Gathercole, Alloway, Willis, & 
Adams, 2004), while visuo-spatial working memory is associated with math performance 
(see Cowan & Alloway, 2008, for a review). Furthermore, some students can display 
strengths in one area and weaknessness in another (Alloway, Rajendran, & Archibald, 2009). 
The inclusion of processing and recall scores from the working memory tasks allow 
us to investigate which aspects are associated with verbal deception (see Alloway & Alloway, 
2013). One possiblity is that the processing aspect of working memory is controlled by a 
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centralized component (i.e., the central executive or controlled attention) and so both verbal 
and visuo-spatial processing would be linked to lie-telling. In contrast, the recall aspect is 
thought to be supported by a domain-specific component (i.e., verbal or visuo-spatial 
stimuli), and it is possible that only verbal recall would be linked to verbal deception. 
Therfore we predict that children’s verbal working memory will be related to their semantic 
leakage control, while children’s visuo-spatial working memory will not. 
In the present study, six- and seven-year-olds were recruited as previous research 
demonstrates that this age group has undergone the develpmental shift required to 
successfully tell lies, and manage semantic leakage. For example, Talwar and Lee (2002) 
found that three to five year olds would blurt out incriminating information that revealed their 
lies, such as the name of the toy that they denied playing with. In contrast, a greater 
proportion of the six and seven year olds were able to successfully avoid revealing such 
information.  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 137 children were recruited from the equivalent of a second grade class 
from four British schools. However, two participants from the experimental condition were 
not included in the data analyses as they did not follow the instructions for the trivia game. In 
the experimental condition, there were 114 remaining children (55% boys), with a mean age 
of 6 years, 8 months (SD=6.57 months; range: 5 years, 10 months to 7 years, 9 months). In 
the control (permission) condition, there were 21 children (52% boys), with a mean age of 6 
years, 9 months (SD=7 months; range 6 years, 0 months - 7 years, 8 months). The children 
were predominately Caucasian and from middle-income families.  
Materials and Procedure 
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Temptation resistance paradigm: This paradigm required the children not to peek at 
an answer on the back of a card when left alone in a room (see Talwar et al., 2007). The 
children were tested in school and told that they were going to play a trivia game where they 
had to answer three multiple-choice questions. For each correct answer, the child received a 
token. They were told if they collected three tokens they would receive a prize. All questions 
were written on cards with four possible answers written on the front of the card. The correct 
answer was written on the reverse side of the card in different colors of ink with an unrelated 
picture below the answer. The question was read aloud to the child. After the child answered, 
they were shown the card so they could see the answer and picture.  
In Question 1, they were asked: What noise does a dog make? (Choices: meow, 
quack, woof, or moo). The back of the card had the answer in red ink (C: Woof) with a 
picture of a car. Question 2 was: What colour are bananas? (Choices: blue, green, pink or 
yellow). The back of the card had the answer in blue ink (D: Yellow) with a picture of a boat. 
The final question was based on a ficticious cartoon character: What is the name of the boy in 
the cartoon ‘Spaceboy’? (Choices: A: Jim; B: Ben; C: Lee, or D: Tom). After the researcher 
presented this question, she left the room and told the child not to peek at the answer written 
on the back of the card. The answer was written in green ink on the back of the card (A: Jim) 
with a picture of a cartoon monkey.  
After one minute, the researcher returned and asked the child if they peeked at the 
answer (Peeking Question). Then they asked them the answer to the question about Spaceboy 
(Trivia Question). If they answered the Trivia Question correctly, they were then asked two 
follow up questions regarding the color of ink the answer was written in and the picture on 
the final answer card (Entrapment Questions). The researcher asked the child: ‘Can you guess 
what color the answer is written in?’  (color question) and ‘Can you guess what picture is on 
the back?’ (picture question). If the children had peeked, then they would know that the 
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correct answer to these questions were: green for the color question and monkey for the 
picture question. 
We also included a control (permission) condition that used the same questions and 
followed a similar procedure. The main difference was that the children were told that they 
could look at the card with the Spaceboy question once the researcher left the room. They 
were not informed that they would be asked about either the color or the picture shown on the 
back of the card. The control condition was included to establish that the children understood 
what was required of them in the temptation resistance paradigm and to show that they would 
indicate that they looked at the card if they peeked, as they were given permission to look. 
The inclusion of this group allowed for the comparison of lying behavior compared to the 
experimental group. 
A video camera hidden in a small cardboard box constructed to fit the camera was 
used to record each session with the children in both the experimental and control conditions. 
The session was recorded so that the researchers could see if the children turned the card over 
and looked at the answer. The researcher was unaware whether the child peeked at the card 
when she returned to the room.  
Using the videos, behaviors were subsequently coded for peeking behavior (did they 
peek – yes or no); and lying behavior (did they admit to peeking – yes or no). We also coded 
the answer given to the final question if they peeked (correct or incorrect) and the answers 
given to the entrapment questions (color and picture). Based on their responses, children in 
the control and experimental conditions who peeked were classified as a good liar (lied to 
both entrapment questions) or a bad liar (lied about one or none of the entrapment questions). 
Sixteen videos from the experimental condition (14%) were coded by two raters 
independently. Cohen’s Kappa was 1.00 for all answers. 
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Working memory. All test trials began with two items, and increased by one item in 
each block, until the participant was unable to recall three correct trials at a particular block. 
There were four trials in each block and the number of correct trials was scored for each 
participant. The stimuli in both working memory tests were randomized so no stimulus 
sequence was repeated to avoid potential practice effects. The move forward and discontinue 
rules, as well as the scoring, were automated by the program. The researcher explained the 
task to the child and confirmed that they understood the task. The children also watched a 
computer-led demonstration, followed by a set of practice trials before beginning the test 
trials. 
In Processing Letter Recall, children viewed a letter in red that stayed on the 
computer screen for one second. The red letter disappeared and a letter in black immediately 
appeared. Participants verified whether the black letter was the same as the red letter by 
clicking ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on the screen (processing). They then had to verbally recall the red 
letters in the correct sequence (recall). The number of correct responses for both the 
processing and recall components was scored. 
Visual working memory was tested using a shape recall test. Participants viewed a 
colored shape in a 4x4 grid. The shape and grid disappeared and another shape appeared in 
the center of the computer screen. They verified whether those two shapes were the same 
color and shape by clicking on a box marked either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ on the screen (processing). 
Then they had to remember the location of the first shape on the 4x4 grid in the correct 
sequence (recall). The number of correct responses for both the processing and recall 
components was scored. The raw scores for recall were converted into standard scores based 
on a normative sample (M=100, SD=15). 
Results 
Working Memory Scores 
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We first looked at the working memory scores across both the control and 
experimental conditions. The relationships within domains are stronger than between 
domains: Verbal WM Recall and Processing (r=.82) and Visuo-spatial WM Recall and 
Processing (r=.90); compared with Verbal and Visuo-spatial WM Recall (r=.30) and Verbal 
and Visuo-spatial WM Processing (r=.35). Based on the high correlations between the verbal 
working memory components (Recall and Processing) and the visuo-spatial working memory 
components (Recall and Processing), we calculated a composite each for verbal and visuo-
spatial working memory. The following analyses were conducted on the composite working 
memory scores. 
Peeking Behavior 
Only a quarter of the children in the experimental condition peeked at the back of the 
card when the researcher left the room (n=28; 24.5%). In contrast, the majority of the 
children in the control condition, who were given permission, peeked at the back of the card 
(n=17; 81%). A chi-square analysis confirmed that more children in the control condition 
peeked compared to those in the experimental condition, χ2 (1)=26.47, p<.001.  
<Table 1> 
We next looked at the working memory scores as a function of peeking behavior in 
the experimental condition (Table 1). A 2x2 MANOVA was conducted on the working 
memory composites (verbal and visuo-spatial) as a function of Peeking (Yes/No) and Gender. 
The Hotelling’s Trace statistic indicated no significant difference in working memory 
performance as a function of Peeking: F<1. There was also no effect of Gender, 
F(1,108)=2.53, p=.09; nor an interaction, F<1. As gender did not yield significant group 
differences, it was not included in subsequent analyses.  
Lie-Telling Behavior 
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When children who peeked were asked if they had looked at the answer while the 
experimenter was gone, only one child in the experimental group admitted to peeking (<1%), 
compared to 53% (n=9) in the control group. A chi-square analysis confirmed that there was 
a significant difference in admission to peeking between the groups: χ2 (1)=12.01, p<.001.  
A 2x2 MANOVA was conducted on the working memory composites (verbal and 
visuo-spatial) as a function of Condition (Control vs Experimental) and Lie-Telling behavior 
(Admit or Deny peeking). The Hotelling’s Trace statistic indicated no significant difference 
in working memory performance as a function of Lie-Telling behavior, F<1; nor of 
Condition, F(2,37)=1.24, p=.30; and the interaction was not significant, F<1. 
Trivia Question 
We next looked at the response to the Trivia Question (What is the name of the boy in 
the cartoon Spaceboy? Jim, Ben, Lee, or Tom) for peekers in both the control and 
experimental conditions. In the control condition, 100% of those who peeked answered 
correctly; while in the experimental condition, 95% of those who peeked answered correctly. 
The child who answered the Trivia Question incorrectly was not used in the analyses, nor was 
the child who confessed to looking at the card (n=26 in the experimental condition). A chi-
square analysis confirmed that these responses in the experimental condition were 
significantly better than a 25% guess rate based on four possible responses; χ2 (1)=18.78, 
p<.001.   
Entrapment Questions 
<Table 2 here> 
Finally, we looked specifically at the link between working memory and the nature of 
the lies the children told. We divided the children who peeked in the control and experimental 
conditions into two groups: those who peeked and lied about their answers to both 
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entrapment questions (good liars) and those who peeked but lied about one or none of their 
answers to the entrapment questions (bad liars; Table 2).  
A 2x2 MANOVA was conducted on the working memory composites (verbal and 
visuo-spatial) as a function of Condition (Control vs Experimental) and responses to the 
Entrapment Questions (Bad vs Good liars). The Hotelling’s Trace statistic indicated a 
significant effect of Condition, F(2,35)=3.45, p=.04, η2p=.17; but not for responses to the 
Entrapment Questions, F(2,35)=1.37, p=.27. The interaction between responses to the 
Entrapment Questions and Condition was significant for Verbal working memory, 
F(1,36)=4.01, p=.05, η2p=.10; but not in Visuo-spatial working memory, F(1,36)=1.27, 
p=.27. Post-hoc analyses (p<.05) indicated that in the experimental condition only, the good 
liars had higher Verbal working memory compared to the bad liars. This finding fits the 
predicted pattern that children’s verbal working memory will be related to their semantic 
leakage control, while children’s visuo-spatial working memory will not. 
Discussion 
The key finding in the present study is related to the role of working memory in 
verbal deception. The good liars performed better in the verbal working memory test 
compared to the bad liars. This is in line with Evans and Lee (2011)’s work; they found that 
of the participants who lied about their behavior, those with better verbal working memory 
were more able to cover their tracks in their follow-up comments (see also Walczyk et al., 
2003 for a model integrating the role of working memory in deception). The finding that 
verbal working memory is associated with good semantic leakage control, while visuo-spatial 
working memory is not, adds to the existing literature and suggests there is a dissociable 
effect in sophisticated lying. This pattern corresponds with theoretical views that working 
memory capacity appears to be supported by two separate pools of domain-specific resources 
for verbal and visuo-spatial information that includes both recall and processing components 
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(Alloway & Alloway, 2013; Jarvis & Gathercole, 2003; also Miyake et al., 2001). In the 
present study, it is possible that verbal working memory was associated with verbal deception 
because both tasks draw from the same cognitive resources. For example, brain imaging 
research on adult deceptive behavior has identified activation in the prefrontal cortex, the 
same regions of the brain that is activated during verbal working memory tasks (Christ, van 
Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009).  
The present study also indicates that Verbal working memory played a key role in lie-
telling. In order for children to avoid entrapment when asked questions about the color the 
answer was written in, or the picture on the back of the card, they had to  keep the 
researcher’s perspective in mind (false belief), as well as manipulate all the components of 
their lie. They had to use their verbal working memory to maintain their deception and avoid 
being caught. Some researchers suggest that a capacity-based explanation of working 
memory can account for its link to false belief tasks (Keenan, Olson, & Marini, 1998). As the 
number of items that children can remember and process increases across development, they 
are better able to juggle the multiple pieces of information necessary in a false belief task, as 
well as represent more complex social connections between these relationships. Keenan 
(1998) suggested that the increase in working memory capacity provides children the mental 
‘space’ to communicate social concepts that they were previously unable to express, due to 
limited mental resources. This skill leads to fewer errors in predicting others’ mental states, 
as they can perform online processing of social cues, rather than rely on heuristics.  
Perspective taking is an important component in a false belief task and recent research 
also suggests that perspective taking is partially regulated by working memory. In a study 
with college students, Wardlow (2013) reported that higher working memory scores meant 
that indvidiuals had more cognitive resources to allocate towards infering perspective 
differences in their conversational partner and intergrating that information with their 
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behavior to guide their language use. Working memory is especially critical when the 
information is considered as privledged ground (knowledge known by one conversational 
partner) rather than common ground (shared knolwedge), as the listener has to recruit these 
cognitive resources in order to consider what to divulge and what to keep hidden (see also 
Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; for additional support for the role of working memory in 
perspective taking).  
With respect to peeking behavior, it should be noted that working memory did not 
play a role in their decision to peek, as there was no difference in performance between the 
peekers and nonpeekers in the experimental group. This pattern reinforces the idea that 
working memory plays a role in processing multiple pieces of information involved in the 
actual lie, but not prior to engaging in lie-telling behavior. Future research could investigate 
the role of working memory in verbal deception across development, as working memory 
capacity increases throughout childhood (Alloway & Alloway, 2013; Alloway, Gathercole, & 
Pickering, 2006), but lie-telling rates decrease (Jensen, Arnett, Feldman, & Cauffman, 2004). 
While the present findings add to the exisiting literature on verbal deception in 
childhood, one limitation was the low incidence of peeking rates in our British sample 
compared to previous studies. Only a quarter of those in the experimental condition peeked 
when the researcher left the room, while 81% of those in the control group (which was given 
permission to look) peeked.  
Several factors could explain the low peeking rates. First, older children peek less 
than younger children (Evans, et al., 2011; Talwar et al., 2007). Thus a study focussing on 6- 
and 7-year-olds would not find the same rates of peeking compared to studies focussing on 
children from 3 years (e.g., Evans et al., 2011; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2008, 
with peeking scores ranging from 50%-95%). Second, British children may be less likely to 
peek than North American children. For instance, while around 70% of North American 3-
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year-olds peek on a classic temptation (Evans, et al., 2011; Lewis, et al., 1989), only 50% of 
British 3-year-olds peek on a similar paradigm (Polak & Harris, 1999). Thus our sample 
being both older and British could explain the low peeking rates. 
One explanation for why there may be cultural differences is the language used in the 
current study. Specifically, the word “peeking” may have had negative connotations for the 
current British cohort and they may have felt guilty about doing so (see Bloom & German, 
2000 for further discussion on the salience of false belief tasks). The British children may 
have thought that the researcher was deliberately trying to trick them and may have refrained 
from peeking as a result (see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Support for this view comes 
from the finding that almost half of the control group lied about peeking, while in a previous 
study, none of the control group lied about peeking (Talwar et al., 2007). There is substantial 
evidence that school-aged children are able to distinguish between moral judgements (i.e., the 
difference between right and wrong) and social conventions (i.e., societal norms; see Turiel, 
2006). It is possible that the British children in the present study viewed “peeking” as a moral 
issue, rather than a social convention, and as a result some of them refrained from peeking 
when presented with the opportunity. This suggestion is speculative and further research 
could investigate the  motivations that drive verbal deception in children, particularly in 
different cultures (see Fu et al., 2012; Talwar, Lindsay, Bala, & Lee, 2002).  
In summary, the present study sheds light on the role of working memory in 
deception.  The data suggest that while verbal working memory predicts lie-telling skills in 
six-year-olds, visuo-spatial working memory does not. 
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Table 1: Working memory scores of the sample (n=131). 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Verbal WM: Recall 1    
2. Verbal WM: Processing .82* 1   
3. Visuo-spatial WM: Recall .30* .31* 1  
4. Visuo-spatial WM: Processing .28* .35* .90* 1 
Note: WM= Working Memory; *. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 2. Working Memory performance as a function of non-peekers and peekers in the 
experimental condition. 
 Non-peekers (n=87) Peekers (n=26) 
Working Memory scores Mean SD Mean (SD) 
Verbal WM: Recall 88.34 10.86 88.22 10.83 
Verbal WM: Processing 10.36 10.27 8.89 4.99 
Verbal WM: Composite 49.35 10.11 48.89 7.37 
Visuo-spatial WM: Recall 91.72 12.61 91.44 13.74 
Visuo-spatial WM: Processing 11.36 9.51 11.63 11.43s 
Visuo-spatial WM: Composite 51.54 10.76 51.94 12.52 
Note: *=standard scores (M=100, SD=15). 
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Table 3: Working Memory performance as a function of bad and good liars in the control and 
experimental conditions. 
 Control Experimental 
 
Bad 
liars (n=10)
Good 
liars 
(n=4) Bad 
liars (n=14) 
Good 
liars 
(n=12) 
Working Memory scores Mean SD Mean (SD) Mean SD Mean (SD) 
Verbal WM: Recall 82.30 7.27 80 1.01 84.29 8.54 93.50 10.83 
Verbal WM: Processing 6.40 4.65 4.50 1.73 7.29 3.60 11.50 5.05 
Verbal WM: Composite 44.35 5.89 42.25 .87 45.79 6.05 52.50 7.34 
Visuo-spatial WM: Recall 92.20 12.86 83.25 4.72 91.36 15.98 92.50 11.46 
Visuo-spatial WM: 
Processing 
14.40 14.93 5.75 2.63 11.43 14.23 12.67 7.73 
Visuo-spatial WM: 
Composite 
53.30 13.62 44.50 3.49 51.39 15.01 52.58 9.45 
 
Note: *=standard scores (M=100, SD=15) 
 
 
